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Abstract
Which shape market competition is likely to exhibit? This question is addressed
in the present paper, where ¯rms can choose whether to act as quantity or price
setters, whether to move early or delay as long as possible at the market stage
and ¯nally whether to be entrepreneurial or managerial. Moreover, ¯rms can
endogenously determine the sequence of such decisions. It is shown that in cor-
respondence of the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, all ¯rms
¯rst decide to delay, then to act as Cournot competitors, and ¯nally stockholders
decide to delegate control to managers. Hence, sequential play between either
managerial or entrepreneurial ¯rms, as well as simultaneous play between en-
trepreneurial ¯rms are ruled out.
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JEL Classi¯cation: D43, L13
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1 Introduction
Which way can we expect ¯rms to play oligopoly games? Are they to behave as
quantity or price-setters? Will they move simultaneously or sequentially? And,
¯nally, which kind of internal organization will they choose to adopt, given the
other choices they have to make? The way ¯rms can be expected to conduct
oligopolistic competition has represented a relevant issue in the economists' re-
search agenda for a long time, and a great deal of e®ort has been made in several
directions.
The earliest literature in this ¯eld treated a relevant feature such as the choice
between simultaneous and sequential moves as exogenous (Stackelberg, 1934;
Fellner, 1949). Later contributions investigated the preferences of ¯rms over the
distribution of roles in price or quantity games (Gal-Or, 1985; Dowrick, 1986;
Boyer and Moreaux, 1987a,b). The preference for leadership (respectively, fol-
lowership) in quantity (price) games can be established on the basis of the slope
of ¯rms' reaction functions or, likewise, resorting to the concepts of strategic sub-
stitutability or complementarity between products (Bulow et al., 1985). A few
contributions have taken into account the possibility that cost asymmetry or un-
certainty may lead to Stackelberg equilibria (Ono, 1982; Alb½k, 1990).1 Finally,
some authors have analysed the choice between price and quantity as a strategic
variable, taking into account only simultaneous equilibria (Singh and Vives, 1984;
Cheng, 1985). Their ¯ndings point to the conclusion that ¯rms should behave as
Cournot players since setting output is a dominant strategy. Friedman (1988) in-
vestigates a duopoly model where ¯rms choose both prices and quantities. Three
cases are described. When both variables are set at the same time, there exists
no pure-strategy non-cooperative equilibrium. When ¯rms choose ¯rst prices (re-
spectively, quantities) and then quantities (prices), the pure-strategy equilibrium
is Bertrand (respectively, Cournot). Another direction taken by several authors
in the Cournot-Bertrand debate is that of capacity constraints under price com-
petition (Levitan and Shubik, 1972; Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983; Osborne and
Pitchik, 1986; Davidson and Deneckere, 1986). Their results can be summarized
as follows. If unit production costs are symmetric, then (i) if each ¯rm's capac-
ity su±ces to serve the whole market, the standard Bertrand outcome emerges;
(ii) if capacity constraints are binding, the Cournot outcome obtains, notwith-
standing ¯rms' price-setting behaviour. Otherwise, if unit production costs are
asymmetric up to capacity, Cournot outcomes need not arise at equilibrium.2 The
intuitive explanation is that the relevant model to describe duopolistic interaction
is alternatively Bertrand or Cournot depending upon how steep is the marginal
1The choice between Bertrand and Cournot behaviour under uncertainty has been dealt
with by Klemperer and Meyer (1986, 1989), through a supply curve approach, of which setting
a speci¯c quantity or price level appears as a special case.
2The endogenous emergence of price leadership by a dominant ¯rm under capacity constraint
is analysed by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992).
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cost curve (cf. Tirole, 1988, p. 224). In a recent contribution, Deneckere and
Kovenock (1996) prove that, under cost asymmetry, there exists an incentive for
the more e±cient ¯rm to drive the rival out of business. This prevents the market
from reaching a Cournot equilibrium.
Recent literature explicitly models the strategic choice of timing, which is
often possible in reality. Robson (1990a) proposes an extended duopoly model
where price competition takes place in a single period, preceded by ¯rms' scat-
tered price decisions, which cannot be altered. Only Stackelberg equilibria emerge
from such a game. In an in°uential paper, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) inves-
tigate the endogenous choice of roles, i.e., the endogenous arising of Stackelberg
or Cournot equilibria, in noncooperative two-person games (typically, duopoly
games), by analysing an extended game where players (say, ¯rms) are required
to set both the actual moves or actions and the time at which such actions are
to be implemented. Their approach is close in spirit to Robson's, though they
also consider Cournot competition and the mixed case where one ¯rm sets her
price and the other ¯rm decides her output level. When ¯rms choose to act at
di®erent times, sequential equilibria obtain, while if they decide to move at the
same time, simultaneous Nash equilibria are observed. The choice of the timing
occurs in a preplay stage which does not take place in real time, so that there is
no discounting associated with waiting and payo®s are the same whether ¯rms
choose to move as soon as possible or to delay as long as they can. The decision
to play early or at a later time is not su±cient per se to yield sequential play,
since an analogous decision taken by the rival leads to simultaneous play.
Hamilton and Slutsky (HS, henceforth) show that a Stackelberg equilibrium
with sequential play is selected as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended
game with observable delay if and only if the outcome of sequential play Pareto-
dominates the outcome associated with simultaneous play (HS, 1990, Theorems
III and IV). Otherwise, if ¯rms are better o® playing simultaneously rather than
accepting the follower's role, the subgame perfect equilibrium involves simultane-
ous play (HS, 1990, Theorem II).3 Summing up, the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the extended game with observable delay involves sequential moves if and
only if the basic game exhibits at least one Stackelberg equilibrium that Pareto-
dominates the simultaneous Nash equilibrium (Lambertini, 1997a).
Pal (1996) explicitly takes into account mixed strategies. He considers an ex-
tended quantity-setting game with two identical ¯rms and two production periods
before the market-clearing instant. He shows that in such a setting only three
outcomes are possible: (i) both ¯rms produce in the second period, so that a
simultaneous Cournot equilibrium obtains; (ii) ¯rms produce in di®erent period,
3HS (1990, section IV) also consider an extended game with action commitment in the spirit
of Dowrick (1986), where each ¯rm must commit to a particular action irrespectively of the rival
trying to lead or follow. This yields multiple equilibria where either both ¯rms play immediately
or one moves immediately while the other delays.
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yielding a Stackelberg-like equilibrium (see also Robson, 1990b); (iii) Stackelberg
warfare may arise when ¯rms produce in the ¯rst period, but both produce more
than in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Finally, as to the interplay between market competition and the internal or-
ganization of the ¯rm, we avail of several contributions where it is shown that in
order to acquire the Stackelberg leader's position in the product market, ¯rms'
stockholders delegate the control over their assets to managers who end up max-
imizing an objective function consisting in a weighted sum of pro¯ts and sales
(Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987; Fershtman et al., 1991;
Polo and Tedeschi, 1992; Barcena-Ruiz and Paz Espinoza, 1996). These authors
stress that the delegation of control to managers in Cournot settings can be ad-
vantageous in that it may give rise to Stackelberg leadership even though ¯rms
move simultaneously. The equilibrium arising in delegation games where ¯rms
are Cournot players indeed involves both ¯rms delegating control in order to try
and achieve a dominant position. All ¯rms would prefer the rivals not to delegate,
and the equilibrium is a®ected by a prisoner's dilemma.4
Summing up, all these branches of the literature on oligopoly theory convey
information as to how ¯rms should conceivably conduct market competition, but
none of them provides an exhaustive answer. If ¯rms are required to take a
number of decision concerning the type of competition they will conduct on the
market, as well as their internal organization, and these decisions are likely to
interact with each other, then what is the equilibrium of such a game, if there
exists any, and if so, is it unique? These are the questions addressed in this
paper, where a linear duopoly model is adopted, and any capacity constraints
or cost asymmetries are assumed away. I shall investigate all the conceivable
settings that can arise in a duopoly market where ¯rms choose between (i) being
entrepreneurial or managerial; (ii) setting prices or quantities; (iii) moving as
early as possible or delaying; and, ¯nally (iv) proceed to optimize in the market
competition stage. As to the choice between price and quantity, I will conform to
the view of Singh and Vives, where the decision is not in°uenced by technological
constraints. The order of the ¯rst three stages is subject to permutations, and
the two ¯rms may not take these decisions according to the same sequence. This
obviously gives rise to a wide number of asymmetric games. The model allows to
derive several of the results obtained in the previous literature in this ¯eld, and
shows that a few of them are not robust and cannot be expected to be observed in
equilibrium. The analysis below shows that the equilibrium of the game envisaged
here is unique and involves managerialization of both ¯rms, after their respective
owners have decided to move as late as possible and act as quantity-setters (if
4Recently, Basu (1995) has extended the basic model due to Vickers (1985), Fershtman and
Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), in order to explicitly model the owner's decision to hire a
manager in a Cournot duopoly. This allows to show that a Stackelberg equilibrium may arise,
with just one ¯rm delegating, even though the cost of hiring an agent is the same across owners.
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goods are substitutes).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic setting is de-
scribed in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of market subgames. The
nature of the equilibrium associated with the whole game tree is then investigated
in section 4. Finally, section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 The model
I adopt a simpli¯ed version of the linear duopoly model introduced by Dixit (1979)
and then used by Singh and Vives (1984) and many others. Two symmetric ¯rms
compete on a market for di®erentiated products, supplying one good each. The
inverse demand function faced by ¯rm i is
pi = 1¡ qi ¡ °qj; (1)
where j 6= i denotes i's rival, and j°j · 1: When ° 2 [¡1; 0); the two goods
are complements, while in the range where ° 2 (0; 1] they are substitutes. In
the remainder of the paper, I shall con¯ne to the latter case, since once one
avails of the results pertaining to substitute goods, a simple reversion gives those
pertaining to the case of complements. From (1), the direct demand function for
¯rm i can be easily obtained:
qi =
1
1 + °
¡ 1
1¡ °2 pi +
°
1¡ °2pj: (2)
Finally, in the mixed setting where, say, ¯rm i is a quantity-setter and ¯rm j is
a price-setter, demand functions look as follows:
pi = 1¡ qi + °(°qj + pj ¡ 1); qj = 1¡ pj ¡ °qi: (3)
I assume ¯rms operate with the same technology, characterized by a constant
marginal production cost which, without loss of generality, can be normalized to
zero. Consequently, pro¯ts coincide with revenues, ¼i = piqi: The assumption
concerning marginal cost can be interpreted as follows. When marginal cost is
symmetric and everywhere °at, ¯rms have the possibility of choosing endoge-
nously the market variable without being in°uenced by technological constraints,
such as capacity.
Firms can choose whether to move at the same time or scatter their respective
decisions. If they decide to move simultaneously, no matter whether early or
late, a Nash equilibrium in prices or quantities (or mixed) obtains. If, conversely,
they move sequentially, then a Stackelberg equilibrium is observed. This is what
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) de¯ne as an extended game with observable delay.
In order to illustrate this concept, consider the simplest extended game where
¯rms can set a single strategic variable (e.g., price or quantity) and must choose
between moving ¯rst or second. I shall adopt here a symbology which largely
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replicates that in HS (1990, p. 32). De¯ne ¡1 = (N;§1;¦1) the extended game
with observable delay. The set of players (or ¯rms) is N = fA;Bg, and ® and
¯ are the compact and convex intervals of R1 representing the actions available
to A and B in the basic game. ¦1 is the payo® function. Payo®s depend on
the actions undertaken in the basic (market) game, according to the following
functions, a : ® £ ¯ ! R1 and b : ® £ ¯ ! R1. The set of times at which ¯rms
can choose to move is T = fF; Sg, i.e., ¯rst or second. The set of strategies for
player i is §1i = fF; Sg £©i, where ©i is the set of functions that map T £ ¯(or
®) into ®(or ¯). If both ¯rms choose to move at the same time, they obtain the
payo®s associated with the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, (an; bn), otherwise
they get the payo®s associated with the Stackelberg equilibrium, e.g., (al; bf) if
A moves ¯rst and B moves second, or vice versa. The game can be described in
normal form as in matrix 1 (cfr. HS, 1990, p. 33).
B
F S
A F an; bn al; bf
S af ; bl an; bn
Matrix 1
Moreover, ¯rms' stockholders may decide whether to delegate control to man-
agers who are not interested in pro¯t maximization as such, as they own no share,
but rather in sales, so that in case of managerialization ¯rm i 's maximand mod-
i¯es as follows:
Mi = ¼i + µiqi; (4)
where parameter µi identi¯es the weight attached to the volume of sales, and is
optimally set by the stockholder in the employment contract, in order to maximize
pro¯ts (Vickers, 1985).5
The basic structure of the game I shall investigate in the remainder of the
paper can be illustrated as follows. The game involves four decisions, namely,
(i) whether to move simultaneously or sequentially in the market stage,6 (ii)
5Considering a linear contract is known to be restrictive, but it is in line with most of the
existing literature. The approach due to Vickers (1985) is formally equivalent to that adopted
by Fershtman and Judd (1987), where the manager's objective is de¯ned by a linear combination
of pro¯t and revenue. I adopt the former for the sake of simplicity.
6Notice that this decision only concerns the sequence of moves during market competition.
Extending the possibility of choosing a particular timing at any stage would obviously enlarge
to a considerable extent the game tree.
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whether to set a price or a quantity level, (iii) whether to be managerial or en-
trepreneurial; and ¯nally (iv) the optimal action at the market stage. Provided
(iv) is always the last to be taken, the permutations of the previous three deci-
sions, taking into account the possibility for ¯rms to distribute them according
to di®erent sequences along the game tree, give rise to 21 games, out of which 15
are asymmetric. What discriminates is the fact that, in locating the delegation
choice along the decision tree, stockholders indeed determine which decisions are
delegated to the manager and which are not. For instance, if the owner of ¯rm
i locates the delegation stage at the end of his own decision three, this means
that the delegation contract gives the manager the right to decide only upon the
¯rm's behaviour in the market stage, and he has a contractual obligation, say,
to move ¯rst and to be a Cournot agent. Conversely, if delegation takes place
at the ¯rst stage, then it gives the manager the right to decide both whether
to try and become leader or follower, and whether to play a price or a quantity
strategy, besides obviously the ¯nal decision at the market stage. It is worth
stressing that (i) all decisions which are taken by stockholders are unobservable
until the eventual delegation, if any takes place, or the market stage is reached,
in the opposite case; and (ii) if owners decide whether to move early or late and
only after that they proceed to delegate, nonetheless the actual move is up to the
manager: in other terms, in such a situation the decision upon the timing is up
to the owner, while its implementation at the market stage is delegated to the
manager. As a relevant consequence, this entails that the permutation of such
decisions does not a®ect the equilibrium payo®s.
3 Market competition subgames
In this section I provide a review of the three market subgames which can arise,
namely, (i) the subgame observed when no ¯rm has delegated control to an agent,
so that competition takes place between entrepreneurial ¯rms aiming at pro¯t
maximization; (ii) the subgame arising when both ¯rms are managerial; and,
¯nally, (iii) the subgame which obtains if one ¯rm is managerial while the other
is entrepreneurial. All three involve the choice of the timing of moves as well as
the strategic variable.
3.1 The subgame played by entrepreneurial ¯rms
This is a setting which has been deeply analysed in several existing contributions
(e.g., Singh and Vives, 1984; Boyer and Moreaux, 1987b), so I can con¯ne my
attention to the equilibrium payo®s, without dealing with their derivation. To
begin with, when both ¯rms act as quantity-setters, one obtains the following
equilibrium payo®s:
¼CNee =
1
(2 + °)2
; ¼Clee =
(2¡ °)2
8(2¡ °2) ; ¼
Cf
ee =
(4¡ 2° ¡ °2)2
16(2¡ °2)2 ; (5)
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where superscript CN, Cl, and Cf stand for Cournot-Nash, Cournot leader and
Cournot follower, respectively, while subscript ee indicates that both ¯rms are
entrepreneurial.
The Bertrand game yields the following payo®s:
¼BNee =
(1¡ °)
(2¡ °)2(1 + °) ; ¼
Bl
ee =
(1¡ °)(2 + °)2
8(1 + °)(2¡ °2) ; ¼
Bf
ee =
(1¡ °)(4 + 2° ¡ °2)2
16(1 + °)(2¡ °2)2 :
(6)
The meaning of the superscripts appearing in (6) is analogous to (5), mutatis
mutandis.
Finally, in the mixed game where one ¯rm optimize w.r.t. quantity, while the
other maximize pro¯ts w.r.t. price, one gets
¼QNee =
(° ¡ 2)2(1¡ °2)
(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ; ¼
Ql
ee =
(2¡ °)2
8(2¡ °2) ; ¼
Qf
ee =
(1¡ °)(4 + 2° ¡ °2)2
16(1 + °)(2¡ °2)2 ; (7)
¼PNee =
(° ¡ 1)2(° + 2)2
(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ; ¼
Pl
ee =
(1¡ °)(2 + °)2
8(1 + °)(2¡ °2) ; ¼
Pf
ee =
(4¡ 2° ¡ °2)2
16(2¡ °2)2 : (8)
Equation (7) displays the payo®s accruing to the quantity-setter in the three
possible situations where ¯rms play simultaneously or sequentially. The same
holds for the price-setter in equation (8). Obviously, it appears that ¼Clee = ¼
Ql
ee ;
¼Cfee = ¼
Pf
ee ; ¼
Bl
ee = ¼
P l
ee and ¯nally ¼
Bf
ee = ¼
Qf
ee : These equalities imply that in any
sequential play, both ¯rms are just indi®erent as to whether the follower acts as
a price or a quantity-setter.
In the case of substitutability between products, the above payo®s can be
ranked according to the following sequence of inequalities:
¼Clee = ¼
Ql
ee > ¼
CN
ee > ¼
QN
ee > ¼
Cf
ee = ¼
Pf
ee > ¼
Qf
ee = ¼
Bf
ee ¸ ¼Blee = ¼Plee ¸ ¼BNee ¸ ¼PNee
(9)
Accordingly, I can state
Lemma 1 (Singh and Vives, 1984; Boyer and Moreaux, 1987b) When
goods are substitutes (respectively, complements), i.e., ° 2]0; 1] (° 2 [¡1; 0[),
setting quantity (price) is a weakly dominant strategy.
and
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Lemma 2 (Boyer and Moreaux, 1987b; Denicolµo and Lambertini, 1996)
When goods are substitutes (respectively, complements), i.e., ° 2]0; 1] (° 2 [¡1; 0[),
setting quantity (price) as early as possible is a strictly dominant strategy.
The ¯rst Lemma is what leads Boyer and Moreaux (1987b, Proposition III, p.
223) to claim that the strategy space dominates the distribution of roles, in the
sense that if goods are substitutes (complements) both ¯rms are better o® being
quantity-setters (price-setters). The second Lemma states that, once ¯rms have
ruled out the dominated strategy, be that price or quantity, they realize that it
is rational to move at the earliest occasion available.
Finally, from (9) it emerges a further set of results, summarized in
Lemma 3 (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990) When goods are substitutes (re-
spectively, complements), i.e., ° 2]0; 1] (° 2 [¡1; 0[), the subgame perfect equilib-
ria of the extended (sub)games where (i) both ¯rms are Cournot players; (ii) both
¯rms are Bertrand players; and (iii) one ¯rm is a price setter while the other
is a quantity setter, involve respectively (a) simultaneous (sequential) play; (b)
sequential (simultaneous) play; and (c) sequential play, with the quantity (price)
setter in the leader's role.
3.2 The subgame played by managerial ¯rms
Let me now turn to the setting where both ¯rms' stockholders delegate control
over their assets to managers interested in the volume of sales, so that their
objective function at the market stage is as in expression (4).
I shall brie°y resume what happens when ¯rms compete simultaneously in a
Cournot fashion (Vickers, 1985). Managers set quantities so as to maximize (4).
The ¯rst order condition for ¯rm i is
@Mi
@qi
= 1¡ 2qi ¡ °qj + µi = 0; (10)
yielding
qi =
2 + 2µi ¡ ° ¡ °µj
4 + °2
; (11)
when ° = 1, i.e., goods are perfect substitutes, (11) simpli¯es to qi = (1+2µi¡µj),
which obviously coincides with Vickers' ¯ndings (Vickers, 1985, p. 142). By
substituting and rearranging, I obtain
¼i(µi) =
1
4¡ °2
³
2¡ 2µi ¡ ° ¡ °µj + °2µi
´
(2 + 2µi ¡ ° ¡ °µj) ; (12)
which is the objective function that stockholders maximize by optimally setting
µi. The ¯rst order condition is
8
@¼i
@µi
=
1
4¡ °2
h³
°2 ¡ 2
´
(2 + 2µi ¡ ° ¡ °µj) + 2
³
2¡ 2µi ¡ ° ¡ °µj + °2µi
´i
= 0;
(13)
yielding
µCNmm =
°2(2¡ °)
°3 ¡ 4°2 + 8 : (14)
Equilibrium pro¯ts are thus
¼CNmm =
2(2¡ °2)
(°2 ¡ 2° ¡ 4)2 (15)
where subscript mm reveals that both ¯rms are managerial. Notice that the pro¯t
in (15) is smaller than the equilibrium pro¯t associated with the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium without delegation (5) in the range where products are substitutes,
and conversely when they are complements.
In the case where ¯rms take their output decisions sequentially, the equilib-
rium pro¯ts are
¼Clmm =
(2¡ °2)(8¡ 4° ¡ 4°2 + °3)2
2(° ¡ 2)2(° + 2)2(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ; ¼
Cf
mm =
(°2 + 2° ¡ 4)2
4(°2 ¡ 4)(3°2 ¡ 4)2 (16)
with µClmm = 0; which entails that the leading ¯rm's stockholders decide not to
delegate, since, provided they are to move ¯rst, they cannot do any better by
delegating control to a manager.
The setting where ¯rms optimize w.r.t. prices can be quickly dealt with. The
equilibrium pro¯ts are
¼BNmm =
2(1¡ °)(2¡ °2)
(1 + °)(°2 + 2° ¡ 4)2 ; ¼
Bf
mm =
(1¡ °)(°2 ¡ 2° ¡ 4)2
4(° ¡ 2)(1 + °)(2 + °)(3°2 ¡ 4)2
¼Blmm =
(1¡ °)(2¡ °2)(°3 + 4°2 ¡ 4° ¡ 8)2
2(° ¡ 2)2(1 + °)(2 + °)2(3°2 ¡ 4)2 (17)
where, as in the Cournot setting, in case of sequential play the leading ¯rm is de
facto entrepreneurial, i.e., her stockholders set µBlmm = 0: Moreover, when ¯rms
move simultaneously, it is worth stressing that µBNmm < 0 for both ¯rms, i.e.,
contrarily to what happens under Cournot competition, delegation is an anti-
competitive device in that it can used to restrict output and thus raise prices. As
a result, managerialization closely resembles collusion.
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Finally, when a ¯rm optimize w.r.t. price and the other w.r.t. quantity, the
equilibrium pro¯ts are
¼QNmm =
2(° ¡ 1)2(2¡ °2)(°2 ¡ 2° ¡ 4)2
(16¡ 20°2 + 5°4)2 ; ¼
PN
mm =
2(°2 ¡ 1)(°2 ¡ 2)(°2 + 2° ¡ 4)2
(16¡ 20°2 + 5°4)2
(18)
when both delegate and move simultaneously;
¼Qlmm =
(2¡ °2)(8¡ 4° ¡ 4°2 + °3)2
2(° ¡ 2)2(2 + °)2(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ; ¼
Pf
mm =
(°2 + 2° ¡ 4)2
4(°2 ¡ 4)(3°2 ¡ 4) (19)
when the quantity-setter leads (and, again, decides not to delegate, so that µQlmm =
0);
¼Plmm =
(1¡ °)(2¡ °2)(°3 + 4°2 ¡ 4° ¡ 8)2
2(° ¡ 2)2(1 + °)(2 + °)2(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ; ¼
Qf
mm =
(1¡ °)(°2 ¡ 2° ¡ 4)2
4(°2 ¡ 4)(1 + °)(3°2 ¡ 4)
(20)
when the price-setter moves ¯rst (and, again, decides not to delegate, setting
µPlmm = 0).
Summing up, when goods are substitutes, the equilibrium pro¯ts can be or-
dered as follows:
¼Pfmm = ¼
Cf
mm > ¼
CN
mm > ¼
PN
mm > ¼
Cl
mm = ¼
Ql
mm >
¼Plmm = ¼
Bl
mm ¸ ¼Bfmm = ¼Qfmm ¸ ¼BNmm ¸ ¼QNmm (21)
Among the inequalities appearing in (21), a few deserve to be evaluated in isola-
tion. Observe that ¼Cfmm > ¼
CN
mm > ¼
Cl
mm, i.e., the Nash equilibrium breaks as usual
the sequence of the payo®s associated with the Stackelberg equilibrium, though
the latter are reversed as compared to the setting where no delegation takes place
(see above). The leader cannot do any better than she is already doing, in that
delegation does not add anything to the position acquired by moving ¯rst, given
that the two decision are observationally equivalent. A graphical illustration is
provided in ¯gure 1.
Consider ¯rst the usual leader's problem in a game played by pro¯t-maximizing
¯rms. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is represented by point N. Using the addi-
tional information provided by the opponent's reaction function, the leader can
adjust the output level so as to "locate" in the tangency point between his own
10
Figure 1: The Cournot Game
system of isopro¯t curves and the rival's reaction function (point S in ¯gure 1).
Likewise, when ¯rms set their output levels at the same time, the leader's pro¯t
can be attained through delegation, in which case point S is reached through an
outward shift of the leader's reaction function, due to the appropriate choice of µ:
It now appears clearly that delegation and the ability to move ¯rst are observa-
tionally equivalent, or, borrowing the terminology from demand theory, perfect
substitutes. This implies that these instruments cannot be used jointly, but only
alternatively. Hence, if the owner, say, of ¯rm j, anticipates that his manager is
going to move ¯rst in the market subgame, he also knows that there is no reason
to use delegation to achieve the very same goal. The latter consideration can be
interpreted in two ways, namely, that µlj = 0 means either that the delegation
contract allows for no output expansion at all, forcing the manager to maximize
pro¯t only, or that there is no delegation at all and the ¯rm is entrepreneurial.
Consider now the follower's behaviour. If, say, the owner of ¯rm i knows that
his manager is going to move late in the market stage, he ¯nds pro¯table to use
the delegation device so as to shift his own reaction function outwards to such an
extent that the Stackelberg equilibrium point becomes S', where the above pro¯t
sequence applies. This entails that delegation becomes a free-riding device to the
avail of the follower, who ends up producing more and gaining higher pro¯ts than
the leader.7
7As far as the timing of moves is concerned, a more detailed analysis of stockholders' and
managers' incentives is in Lambertini (1997b), where it is shown that the potential con°ict of
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As to the price-setting game, ¼Blmm > ¼
Bf
mm > ¼
BN
mm: Once again, the payo®s
emerging from sequential play are reversed as compared to the usual sequence.
The intuition underlying this result is largely analogous to the previous case.
Finally, in the mixed case, ¼Qlmm > ¼
Qf
mm > ¼
QN
mm and ¼
Pf
mm > ¼
PN
mm > ¼
Pl
mm: Hence,
if, say, ¯rm j selects a quantity strategy, then ¯rm i ¯nds it optimal to imitate
the rival, and move as late as possible; moreover, when ¯rm j decides to move
at the earliest occasion, then ¯rm i moves late, independently on the strategic
variable being set. In none of the situations depicted above the leader chooses to
exploit the possibility of delegation, in that it would add no further advantage.
On these grounds, I can state
Lemma 4 The subgame where both ¯rms have the possibility of delegating control
to managers exhibits no dominant strategy. Under sequential play, the leader
never delegates, so that delegation is observed on both sides only if ¯rms move at
the same time.
3.3 The subgame between an entrepreneurial and a man-
agerial ¯rm
As a ¯nal step towards a comprehensive picture of the whole game, a last case
remains to be investigated, namely, the subgame arising when one ¯rm delegates
control to a manager, while the other remains entrepreneurial.
I shall ¯rst consider the case of Cournot competition. When ¯rms move
simultaneously, their pro¯ts are
¼CNme =
(2¡ °)2
8(2¡ °2) ; ¼
CN
em =
(4¡ 2° ¡ °2)2
16(2¡ °2)2 ; (22)
where subscript me means that the ¯rm in question is managerial (while her
rival is entrepreneurial), and conversely. Evidently, ¼CNme = ¼
Cl
ee and ¼
CN
em = ¼
Cf
ee ,
which is the result obtained by Vickers (1985), i.e., that unilateral delegation
is observationally equivalent to acquiring Stackelberg leadership, although ¯rms
move at the same time.
When instead ¯rms play sequentially, pro¯ts are
¼Clem =
(2¡ °2)(8¡ 4° ¡ 4°2 + °3)2
2(° ¡ 2)2(2 + °)2(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ; ¼
Cf
me =
(2° + °2 ¡ 4)2
4(°2 ¡ 4)(3°2 ¡ 4) ; (23)
when the entrepreneurial ¯rm is leading, while ¼Clme = ¼
CN
me and ¼
Cf
em = ¼
CN
em , in
the opposite case, in that the owner of the candidate managerial ¯rm actually
decides not to hire a manager.
interests that may arise under this respect is irrelevant, in that the choice of timing by managers
entails the same pro¯ts owners would attain by specifying the timing in the delegation contract.
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the outcome of simultaneous play in prices is fairly intuitive, in that again
the managerial ¯rm is de facto in the leader's position, so that ¼BNme = ¼
Bl
ee and
¼BNem = ¼
Bf
ee : As to sequential play, one obtains
¼Blem =
(1¡ °)(2¡ °2)(4°2 + °3 ¡ 4° ¡ 8)2
2(1 + °)(° ¡ 2)2(2 + °)2(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ; ¼
Bf
me =
(1¡ °)(°2 ¡ 2° ¡ 4)2
4(1 + °)(°2 ¡ 4)(3°2 ¡ 4) ;
(24)
when the entrepreneurial ¯rm is leading, while in the opposite case the leader
does not delegate and ¼Blme = ¼
BN
me and ¼
Bf
em = ¼
BN
em :
Finally, it comes to the case where one ¯rms sets an output level while the
rival sets a price level. The outcomes of simultaneous play are straightforward,
since they observationally correspond to sequential play outcomes in complete
absence of delegation: when the managerial ¯rm is a quantity setter, we have
¼QNme = ¼
Ql
me and ¼
PN
em = ¼
Pf
em; while in the opposite situation when the en-
trepreneurial ¯rm is leading, we have ¼PNme = ¼
Pl
me and ¼
QN
em = ¼
Qf
em : Likewise,
it can be easily determined that ¼Qlme = ¼
CN
me = ¼
Cl
ee ; ¼
Pf
em = ¼
Pf
ee = ¼
CN
em and
¼P lme = ¼
Pl
ee ; ¼
Qf
em = ¼
Qf
ee ; etc., when the candidate managerial ¯rm takes the lead
(and does not delegate). When instead it is the entrepreneurial ¯rm to play the
leader's role, we get ¼P lem = ¼
Bl
em; ¼
Qf
me = ¼
Bf
me and ¼
Ql
em = ¼
Cl
em; ¼
Pf
me = ¼
Cf
me :
Given the above equalities, in the case of substitutes (° 2]0; 1]), the payo®s
pertaining to this speci¯c subgame can be synthetically ranked as follows:
¼Clme = ¼
CN
me = ¼
QN
me = ¼
Ql
me > ¼
Cf
me = ¼
PN
me = ¼
Pf
me > ¼
Cl
em = ¼
QN
em = ¼
Ql
em > ¼
Bl
em = ¼
Pl
em
> ¼Cfem = ¼
Pf
em = ¼
PN
em > ¼
Qf
me = ¼
Bf
me > ¼
Qf
em = ¼
BN
em = ¼
Bf
em > ¼
BN
me = ¼
Bl
me (25)
This leads to
Lemma 5 When only one ¯rm has the possibility of delegating while the other
is entrepreneurial, both ¯rms have the same weakly dominant strategy, which
consists in being Cournot agents and move at the earliest occasion.
Moreover, together with the results obtained in the previous subsection, the
above analysis yields
Lemma 6 A candidate managerial ¯rm does indeed exploit the possibility of dele-
gating control if and only if she does not move earlier than her rival, independently
of the internal organization of the latter.
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4 The ¯ve-stage game
I am now in a position to illustrate what happens in the manifold epiphanies of
the whole game tree. In order to simplify the exposition, I shall (i) resort to the
normal form representation; (ii) con¯ne to one symmetric game (the reasons at
the basis of its choice will become clear below); and (iii) consider only the case
of substitutability.
The overall number of payo®s arising from downstream market subgames is
sixteen. This is due to the fact that, from the observational point of view, the
possible equilibrium outcomes are ten, of which four are symmetric, namely, those
associated with simultaneous Bertrand or Cournot equilibria, with and without
delegation on both sides.
The presence of three di®erent stages, before market competition takes place,
gives rise to 21 di®erent games, of which six are symmetric, namely those where
both ¯rms distribute their decisions according to one of the following sequences:
a) F/S; C/B; D/ND
b) F/S; D/ND; C/B
c) C/B; D/ND; F/S
d) C/B; F/S; D/ND
e) D/ND; C/B; F/S
f) D/ND; F/S; C/B,
where F/S represents the choice pertaining to the timing of moves, i.e., play early
(¯rst) or late (second); C/B represents the choice between being a quantity or a
price setter; and ¯nally D/ND represents the choice between delegating control
to a manager or not. Where the latter appears at the end of the sequence, no
decision except the optimal price/quantity behaviour is delegated to the manager.
Hence, the game presents, overall, ¯ve stages, of which three (those above) can
be combined in several sequences. The ¯rst stage of the game is actually a meta-
stage, in that it involves the draft of one such sequence out of the six available,
by each ¯rm. The ¯fth stage is the actual market game.
I focus on game (a), where indeed it is the case that, if delegation occurs,
is such that the manager can only determine market performance, being told to
conduct it, say, by playing at the ¯rst occasion and being a quantity setter. Given
the symmetry of the game, it su±ces to investigate the two submatrices where
both ¯rms move either at the same time or sequentially. These are, respectively,
matrix 2 and matrix 3, where ¯rm i is the row player and ¯rm j is the column
player.
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j
F
C; D C; ND B; D B; ND
C; D ¼CNmm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
CN
me ; ¼
CN
em ¼
QN
mm; ¼
PN
mm ¼
QN
me ; ¼
PN
em
i F C; ND ¼CNem ; ¼
CN
me ¼
CN
ee ; ¼
CN
ee ¼
QN
em ; ¼
PN
me ¼
QN
ee ; ¼
PN
ee
B; D ¼PNmm; ¼
QN
mm ¼
PN
me ; ¼
QN
em ¼
BN
mm; ¼
BN
mm ¼
BN
me ; ¼
BN
em
B; ND ¼PNem ; ¼
QN
me ¼
PN
ee ; ¼
QN
ee ¼
BN
em ; ¼
BN
me ¼
BN
ee ; ¼
BN
ee
Matrix 2
This subgame can be quickly solved by reducing the matrix through the dele-
tion of a dominated strategy, namely FBND, which is at least weakly if not
strictly dominated by the remaining three. It is quickly shown that the resulting
3£ 3 matrix has (FCD, FCD) as its unique equilibrium in pure strategies. This
also implies that (SCD, SCD) is the unique equilibrium of the subgame where
both ¯rms move late.
As to the mixed setting where ¯rms play sequentially, matrix 3 shows that ¯rm
i is indi®erent between the pro¯les FCD and FCND, while ¯rm j is indi®erent
between SCD and SBD. This entails that any combination of the four pro¯les
just mentioned can be an equilibrium of such a subgame, as well as that where
¯rm i plays late and ¯rm j plays early.
j
S
C; D C; ND B; D B; ND
C; D ¼Clmm; ¼
Cf
mm ¼
Cl
me; ¼
Cf
em ¼
Ql
mm; ¼
Pf
mm ¼
Ql
me; ¼
Pf
em
i F C; ND ¼Clem; ¼
Cf
me ¼
Cl
ee ; ¼
Cf
ee ¼
Ql
em; ¼
Pf
me ¼
Ql
ee ; ¼
Pf
ee
B; D ¼Plmm; ¼
Qf
mm ¼
Pl
me;¼
Qf
em ¼
Bl
mm; ¼
Bf
mm ¼
Bl
me; ¼
Bf
em
B; ND ¼Plem; ¼
Qf
me ¼
P l
ee ; ¼
Qf
ee ¼
Bl
em; ¼
Bf
me ¼
Bl
ee ; ¼
Bf
ee
Matrix 3
As a result, the reduced form of the whole game is that depicted in matrix
4. Observe that the payo®s may thought of as describing a situation where
both ¯rms are managerial Cournot players and have to decide whether to play
sequentially (strategy combinations x-y and y-x) or simultaneously (x-x and y-
y); since strategy z is strictly dominant for both players, the game has a unique
equilibrium identi¯ed by (x, x ), i.e., (SCD, SCD): both ¯rms decide to delay as
long as possible.
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j
w z
i w ¼CNmm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
Cl
mm; ¼
Cf
mm
z ¼Cfmm; ¼
Cl
mm ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm
Matrix 4
Hence, I can formulate
Proposition 1 In the game where ¯rms ¯rst determine the timing, then choose
the strategic variable and ¯nally their organizational structure, the unique equi-
librium existing involves both ¯rms deciding to move at the latest occasion, to be
quantity setters and to delegate the output decision to managers.
As to the remaining twenty games, they can be solved in the same way as the
above one. It turns out that, observationally, only four equilibrium outcomes are
possible: (¼CNmm; ¼
CN
mm); (¼
Cf
mm; ¼
Cl
mm); (¼
Cl
mm; ¼
Cf
mm); and ¯nally (¼; ¼), i.e., the payo®s
associated with the correlated equilibrium where the pro¯ts accruing to the ¯rms
amount to (¼Cfmm; ¼
Cl
mm) and (¼
Cl
mm; ¼
Cf
mm), alternatively.
8
I am thus in a position to summarize the whole range of epiphanies of the
game in matrix 5.
j
fs cb dnd
dndcb cbdnd dndfs fsdnd cbfs fscb
fs dndcb ¼; ¼ ¼CNmm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
Cf
mm; ¼
Cl
mm
cbdnd ¼CNmm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
Pf
mm; ¼
Ql
mm ¼
PN
me ; ¼
QN
em ¼; ¼ ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm
i cb dndfs ¼CNmm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
Ql
mm; ¼
Pf
mm ¼; ¼ ¼; ¼ ¼
Pf
mm; ¼
Ql
mm ¼
Pf
mm; ¼
Ql
mm
fsdnd ¼CNmm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
QN
em ; ¼
PN
me ¼; ¼ ¼; ¼ ¼
Pf
mm; ¼
Ql
mm ¼
Cf
mm; ¼
Cl
mm
dnd cbfs ¼CNmm; ¼
CN
mm ¼; ¼ ¼
Ql
mm; ¼
Pf
mm ¼
Ql
mm; ¼
Pf
mm ¼; ¼ ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm
fscb ¼Clmm; ¼
Cf
mm ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
Ql
mm; ¼
Pf
mm ¼
Cl
mm; ¼
Cf
mm ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm
Matrix 5
Legenda: ¼Clmm = ¼
Ql
mm = ¼
QN
em ; ¼
Pf
mm = ¼
Cf
mm = ¼
PN
me :
¼ = (¼Clmm + ¼
Cf
mm)=2; or the average of any other pair of pro¯ts observationally
equivalent to the Cournot-Stackelberg outcome under two-sided delegation.
8Some of the games yielded by particular permutations are characterized by equilibria where
pro¯ts are (¼Qlmm; ¼
P f
mm) or (¼
QN
em ; ¼
P N
me ); which are observationally equivalent to (¼
Cl
mm;¼
Cf
mm):
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By subdividing it in nine quadrants, the matrix can be quickly reduced. For
instance, consider the four north-east cells describing the subgame arising when
both ¯rms locate the decision concerning the timing of moves at the ¯rst stage. In
such a setting, the strategy pro¯le FSCBDND is weakly dominant for both ¯rms,
so that the equilibrium outcome of this subgame is (¼CNmm;¼
CN
mm), i.e., exactly that
associated to the particular game described by matrices 2-4, (SCD, SCD).
Proceeding likewise for the rest of the subgames depicted in matrix 5, one
obtains its reduced form, matrix 5.1, whose unique equilibrium is (g, g), i.e.,
the equilibrium of that particular game where the timing decision is taken ¯rst,
followed by the choice of the variable and ¯nally by the decision concerning the
structure of the ¯rm.
j
g h k
g ¼CNmm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
Pf
mm; ¼
Ql
mm ¼
CN
mm; ¼
CN
mm
i h ¼Qlmm; ¼
Pf
mm ¼; ¼ ¼
Pf
mm; ¼
Ql
mm
k ¼CNmm; ¼
CN
mm ¼
Ql
mm; ¼
Pf
mm ¼; ¼
Matrix 5.1
We already know from Proposition 1 that the equilibrium of such a game is
(SCD, SCD). Any other permutation of rows (or columns) in matrices 5 and 5.1
leads to the same conclusion. Hence, I can claim
Proposition 2 When stockholders are faced with the need of determining how
to conduct the ensuing market competition, they ¯rst decide that the move at the
market stage shall be taken as late as possible; then, decide to behave as Cournot
agents; ¯nally, they delegate the output choice to managers. No other sequence
of decisions is subgame perfect.
Obviously, this applies in the case of substitute goods; when goods are com-
plements, Bertrand behaviour is selected and ¯rms move early, their optimal
strategy being selected by managers. Proposition 2 can be given the following
twofold explanation. First, the allocation of the decision concerning the timing of
moves at the ¯rst stage leaves open the possibility of being a Bertrand follower.
As a consequence, owners can say that they prefer to move late in that they
can always delegate as a remedy, should they happen to play a quantity strat-
egy. Second, and more relevant, the decision to move late is a sound one in the
light of the rational anticipation of being managerial Cournot ¯rms thereafter.
Which is precisely what happens at the second stage: stockholders prefer to be
Cournot players in that this is a dominant strategy. Then, in the following stage
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where the internal organization of the ¯rm must be designed, they must delegate
the control over the output decision to agents interested in expanding the scale
of production, in order to try and fully exploit the decision taken at the ¯rst
stage. As a consequence, the equilibrium outcome of the whole decision tree is
observationally equivalent to Vickers' (1985) result, but for the absence of timing
in his paper. In other words, Vickers' equilibrium must be indeed expected to
emerge as the subgame perfect equilibrium of a game where ¯rms can completely
shape the nature of competition, provided that they must not take into account
capacity constraints.
The above discussion produces the following two relevant corollaries:
Corollary 1 If the decision problem faced by ¯rms at the outset of an oligopoly
game is fully °edged, neither the simultaneous Cournot equilibrium, nor any se-
quential play will obtain.
This amounts to saying that the claims contained in Lemmata 2 and 3 above
are not robust to the extension of the decision problem faced by ¯rm to include
the possibility of separation between ownership and control. Moreover,
Corollary 2 The possibility of delegation cancels the dominance of the strategy
space over the distribution of roles.
From the optimal strategy pro¯le, it appears that it is no longer true that the
choice of the strategy space is more relevant than the choice of roles (see Lemma
1). Indeed, ¯rms chose ¯rst the timing, and decide to move late, which they
would clearly avoid in the absence of any possibility of delegation.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have tackled the issue how ¯rms can be expected to endogenously
shape market competition, if they are to decide upon the strategy space, the
timing of moves, their own internal organization as well as the sequence according
to which such decisions are to be taken.
The equilibrium of the whole game turns out to be unique, such that in
the case of substitutability between products, the decisions are taken as follows:
¯rst, ¯rms' owners decide to play as late as possible, then choose to set quantities
rather than prices (the opposite holds when goods are complements), and ¯nally
delegate control to managers who are thus exclusively entitled to decide upon the
output level at the market stage. This equilibrium observationally reproduces the
one derived by Vickers (1985), and appears thus to stress the relevance of the
internal structure of ¯rms in determining how market competition should look
like. Conversely, this result seems to cast a shadow on a variety of outcomes
which have received a large deal of attention throughout the years. In particular,
it seemingly rules out any possibility of observing sequential play, i.e., Stackelberg
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equilibria, as well as simultaneous equilibria where ¯rms act as strict pro¯t-
maximizers.
The above conclusions hold in a setting where ¯rms' choices between price
and output strategies are assumed not to be a®ected by technology, i.e., either
capacity constraints or increasing marginal cost. A relevant extension of the
foregoing analysis would consist in taking into account the role played by the
slope of cost curves.
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